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FEDERAL STATES IN THE BROADER WORLD
Matthew Schaefer*
I would like to take a look at how federalism affects foreign relations law
in the United States. About ten years ago some scholars began questioning
the foreign affairs orthodoxy, what is sometimes referred to as foreign affairs
exceptionalism, in U.S. constitutional law.' They came to be known as the
revisionist scholars.
Three features characterize foreign affairs exceptionalism. The first
feature is Executive Branch preeminence in foreign affairs, in contrast to
congressional control. The second feature is judicial law making in foreign
affairs. The third feature is the irrelevance of federalism.
I am only going to focus in on this third feature, the irrelevance of
federalism, and the extent to which this feature remains true, or should
remain true, today.
The relationship of federalism to U.S. foreign affairs has two aspects to it.
First, what limits does the U.S. Constitution place on state involvement in
foreign affairs? Second, what limits does the Constitution place on the
Federal Government's ability to use its international agreement making
powers to impinge on state regulatory authority?
Let us start with the first aspect, the limits on state foreign policy making
in the U.S. Constitution. Here we look at not only the ability of the federal
government to preempt certain state activity, but also at whether the U.S.
Constitution itself, even in the absence of federal government actions,
prohibits certain state activities in foreign affairs. This latter limit is what is
called the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine. It is termed dormant because
these limits apply even when the federal government has not acted, or, in
other words, when its foreign affairs power lies dormant.
The Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine was laid out in a 1969 Supreme
Court case called Zschernig.2 The Supreme Court has never struck down a
law on that basis again. What they struck down in the Zschernig case was not
a state law on its face, but rather a state law as applied. In essence, there was
Schaefer bio.
'See, e.g., Symposium, ForeignAffairs Law at the End of the Century: PartII- Role of
the States in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, (Fall 1999); Jack Goldsmith,
Federal Courts,ForeignAffairs, and Federalism, 83 VA L. REV. 1617, (1997).
2 Zschernig v. Miller, 398 U.S. 429 (1968).
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a statute that denied inheritance rights to certain heirs from communist
countries if they could not show that a U.S. citizen would have a reciprocal
right to take inheritances in that country and that such inheritances would not
be subject to confiscation. State court judges took the application or
interpretation of these laws as an opportunity to criticize .the Soviet Union
and communist governments. The Supreme Court found that this dicta by
state court judges had more than some incidental effect on U.S. foreign
relations and struck the law down as applied. The test created in Zschernig is
whether the state activity has more than some incidental or indirect effect on
U.S. foreign relations. In other words, the test of Zschernig is a threshold
effects test.
Revisionist scholars question the existence or need for the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Doctrine. They, in essence, say the U.S. Constitution allows
the federal government to preempt state activities when they have harmful
effect on U.S. foreign relations and that the Court should not be
independently applying constitutional limits on state activities in foreign
relations.
However, I think there is reason to question the geopolitical and
functional underpinnings of this revisionist school. Revisionists rely on the
end of the Cold War as reason to end the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine.3
They argue that the doctrine arose out of the Cold War era. While it is true
that Zschernig was decided at the height of the Cold War, there are numerous
problems with this argument by revisionist scholars.
First of all, as Mr. Farber indicated, we see the beginnings of a Dormant
Foreign Affairs Doctrine much earlier than 1969. You see Court statements,
Supreme Court statements, speaking of an exclusive federal power over
foreign relations as early as the 1820's. In fact, the origin of the Supreme
Court's view of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs may be found in an
1820's case in which Vermont tried to negotiate the extradition of a criminal
back to Canada.4 Although that action by Vermont was struck down under
the Compact Clause, which prevents states from entering into compacts with
foreign governments without the consent of Congress, there is also language
in the opinion that suggests a broader federal exclusivity over foreign affairs.
One sees this view in opinions all the way through the 1800's, the early and
mid-1900's and culminating in the Zschernig opinion. A necessary
concomitant of federal exclusivity over foreign relations is a Dormant
Foreign Affairs Doctrine. If the federal powers are exclusive, then there are
no concurrent powers in the states. Whether the federal government is
3 See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO.
L.

REV. 1089, 1105 (1999).
4 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 570 (1840).
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utilizing that power or not, the states are prohibited from engaging in foreign
affairs. Although the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine was not formally
established, in terms of being the central or key element in striking down a
state measure until 1969, it's origins or theoretical underpinnings can be
traced back to a century and a half before the Zschernig case.
Second, significant state activity or involvement in foreign affairs did not
begin to occur until the 1950's and 1960's. There were certainly sporadic
episodes throughout U.S. history, but no one can question that the
involvement of states in foreign affairs did not dramatically increase until the
1950's and 1960's.
The other Cold War-related factor that revisionist scholars look to is that
now the penalties that the U.S. will face as a result of state engagement in
foreign relations are not as significant. In the Cold War, our very survival,
our very existence, was at issue. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the
revisionists argue that there is room for state involvement in foreign affairs
because there is no longer this draconian penalty that may occur as a result of
state involvement and state affairs.
I find this argument somewhat curious too. The Cold War had a kind of
rationality; although I hesitate to use that word, in the regime of mutually
assured destruction. Both sides knew the draconian penalty was so severe
that they were going to avoid it. Clearly, the Soviets would not resort to such
measures for minor irritants like state court judges criticizing communist
governments
The situation is quite different now at the end of the Cold War. Some
people had questioned why in the materials we had included this article by
Sandy Berger on U.S. foreign relations. 5 This is where the relevance of that
article becomes clear. Instead of vertical proliferation with the U.S. and the
Soviets upping their own nuclear arms, we now have horizontal proliferation.
We have dangerous weapons in the hands of governments that may not be so
rational in using them and other weapons of mass destruction. But it is not
primarily these draconian penalties that we need to fear as a result of state
intrusions into foreign affairs. Retaliation can take many forms in an era of
unrestricted warfare or non-military means of warfare, such as cyber warfare;
or the spreading of false rumors that can injure financial markets and
economies. Additionally, our adversaries are not as clear anymore. There
are rogue states. There are splintering nations. Even allies of the U.S.
sometimes find that it is convenient for certain reasons to backlash against
the U.S. In short, there are more potential countries that can retaliate against
the U.S. with a broader array of penalties beyond the draconian one most
Samuel R. Berger, A Foreign Policy For A Global Age, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 2000.
5
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focused on during the Cold War. Thus, the end of the Cold War cannot be a
reason for abandoning the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine.
Another reason that is suggested by revisionist scholars for ending the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine is that we now have what we call targeted
retaliation in international affairs. 6 In other words, a foreign nation can target
retaliation against a specific subnational (e.g. U.S. state) government. One of
the key functional or policy reasons for prohibiting states from engaging in
foreign affairs, and even the founders had this concern, was the risk that
retaliation against a state action in foreign affairs would affect the nation as a
whole. For instance, trade sanctions could affect states outside the state
taking the foreign policy action. Revisionist scholars argue that increased
contact, and increased communication, increased awareness by countries of
the U.S. political system, have increased understanding of the internal
allocation of power in the U.S. They argue that other nations are not likely to
misascribe the actions of one state to the nation as a whole. In other words,
there is no longer an externalities problem with states engaging in foreign
relations. Retaliation can be targeted. It can be directly and discretely
confined to the state taking the action. However, this pillar of revisionism is
also problematic on many fronts.
First of all, it assumes that sanctions will only be economic. Economic
sanctions are easy, at least as a theoretical matter, to target. Retaliation in
forms like cyber warfare are much harder to target towards in a particular
U.S. state.
Second, some countries may want to impose sanctions against a U.S.
state but may have very little trade and investment with that state and indeed
the U.S. as a whole because of U.S. federal government sanctions.
Therefore, that foreign government may not even have the opportunity of
sanctioning that state in an economic manner, either through trade or tax
policy.
Third, there is the diversion problem with targeted sanctions. This is why
countries are somewhat hesitant to use them. For example, in the so-called
GATT beer cases between the United States and Canada, the United States
did target retaliation against Ontario. However, the U.S. government was
worried Ontario beer would be shipped to another province and then come
into the U.S. via that other province. Diversion is always a problem with
targeted retaliation, which makes foreign nations hesitant to use it.
Fourth, there is the problem of spillovers. Spillover effects are almost
always in existence. For instance, in the Massachusetts Burma case, the
European Union (EU) apparently threatened to target sanctions against razor
6

See, e.g., Peter Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1267
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blades because of Gillette, a major razor blade manufacturer, is
headquartered in Massachusetts. However, there are razor blades produced
in other states. There are always going to be spillover effects into other
states.
Fifth, sometimes foreign governments may elect to not target retaliation
against a particular state, but instead use the retaliation to boost or reward
important domestic political interests.
Sixth, foreign governments may have an improved understanding of our
internal allocation of power here in the United States. However, this does
not suggest they will always elect to target retaliations since they certainly
understand that the federal government retains the power to bring a state into
compliance with international obligations. For example, instead of targeting
retaliation against Massachusetts for the Massachusetts Burma law, a foreign
government may instead target retaliation against a state represented by the
committee chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate
Finance Committee. Or if a Presidential election is coming up, a foreign
government may target retaliation against the state that is going to be critical
in an upcoming Presidential election.
Seventh, this notion does not take into account more subtle and hidden
forms of retaliation like reduced cooperation in international organizations.
Even if the U.S. federal government can somehow exercise it's power to
prevent retaliation altogether, the U.S. government has now used that power
on behalf of that one state and not on behalf of all of our citizens.
Eighth, the revisionists ignore other functional arguments against state
foreign policy making, including considerations related to efficiency and
expertise in foreign affairs.
Sometimes state sanctions against foreign governments are mentioned as
useful experiments. However, these are uncontrolled experiments. We
cannot tell whether a state sanction against a foreign government was
successful or not, even if the foreign government changed its policy because
there are so many other factors to take into account, including sanctions by
other states, sanctions by the U.S. federal government, or sanctions by other
foreign governments against this particular nation.
Finally, we need to address the issue of why the United States should not
rely solely on preemption by the federal government to curb state foreign
policy making. Why do we need this Dormant Doctrine? Do not the federal
branches, the Congress and the Executive, have the time to police state
activity in foreign relations? The response to this question requires a brief
background on preemption. We have three types of preemption in U.S. law.
The first type of preemption is express. The federal government says
expressly the states are prohibited from entering the field.
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The second type of preemption is conflict. There are two types of
conflict preemption: Direct conflict, where it is physically impossible to
comply with both the state and federal measure, and obstacles conflict, where
it is not physically impossible to comply with both commands but the state
law stands as an obstacle to achieving the full purposes of the federal act.
The third type is implied preemption. There are two types of implied
preemption: Occupation of the field, where the federal regulation of the field
is so extensive that states are preempted from entering the field, and
dominant federal interest preemption, where in an area like foreign affairs
courts more readily imply preemption of state activity.
In the Massachusetts Burma case, Massachusetts enacted a procurement
law in early 1996 that imposed a ten percent negative preference against
companies doing business in Burma. Federal sanctions were enacted later in
1996 and federal government did not expressly preempt the Massachusetts
law. The federal law prohibited only new investment in Burma. As you can
tell from the Massachusetts statute, it sought to penalize even existing
investment in Burma. Since the federal government did not expressly
preempt the Massachusetts law, was the Congress and President really trying
to show they were in favor of the Massachusetts Act? I think you cannot
really infer that from the lack of express preemption. The Congress and
Executive Branch are well aware of other forms of preemption and may find
it politically easier not to expressly preempt state law. Indeed, the Supreme
Court found preemption on the basis of obstacles conflict. If they had not
found preemption on the basis of obstacles conflict, there is a very good
chance they would have found preemption on the basis of implied
preemption.
The problems with solely relying on preemption to curb state actions are
several. First, courts require some affirmative action by the federal
government. For example, assume the federal government is aware of a
foreign policy situation with a foreign government and they want to pursue
quiet diplomacy. They do not want to jump into sanctions. Courts are going
to be hesitant to find conflicts or implied preemption in those cases where
there is no federal act. Thus, one problem with relying simply on policing of
state conduct through preemption is that it does not protect federal efforts at
quiet diplomacy.
Second, preemption findings by courts can at times appear somewhat
disingenuous. Under the conflict and applied branches of preemption, courts
are attempting to glean Congressional intent. The court is asking, "Did the
Congress intend to preempt the state measure?"
Ironically, in the
Massachusetts Burma situation, it is probably the case that Congress and the
Executive did not have any single intent on the pre-emption issue. Indeed

Schaefer-FEDERAL STATES IN THE BROADER WORLD

Massachusetts' federal representatives all clamored that the procurement
statute was something that Massachusetts, as a state, should be allowed to do.
In contrast, the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine can lead to more
genuine analysis. It is based on the Constitution's structure, the Framer's
intent, and the Supreme Court jurisprudence that has flowed throughout U.S.
history viewing foreign affairs is an exclusive federal government matter.
Having criticized the revisionists, what about finding some common
ground with them? I think we can do so when we turn to the standard of
review under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine. I mentioned that in
Zschernig the court established a threshold effects test, asking whether the
state action has more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign
relations.
However, a threshold effects test is poorly suited to the courts. In fact,
the courts themselves have admitted as much. They are poor judges as to
what state actions are going to cross this threshold line. Courts realize the
Executive Branch is in a better position to judge impacts on U.S. foreign
relations. Thus, courts give some weight to Executive Branch views
expressed in amicus briefs in these cases, all the while saying these views are
not dispositive. If the Executive Branch views were dispositive, courts
would relinquish their role as an independent arbitrator under the
Constitution.
Even worse, a threshold effects test allows a foreign government to file
an amicus brief and claim a particular state action is affecting its relations
with the United States. By giving weight to foreign government amicus
briefs, it might be argued that courts have partially turned over the resolution
of a U.S. Constitutional issue to a foreign government. Worse yet, courts
may look at the mere existence of a World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute, regardless of whether the state measure is ultimately found to violate
one of our trade agreements, as evidence the state action has an effect on
U.S. foreign relations. This is another damaging result of applying a
threshold effects test under Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine.
Motive or purpose review under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
would ask, "Is the purpose of the state measure to change or advance the
policy of a foreign government?" I am not saying that this will lead to
certain results in all cases, or that it does not have any problems itself. What
I am suggesting is that it better suits the competence of courts. They are
quite good at fleshing out the purpose behind enactments. It also suits the
competence of state legislators and state officials. Sometimes we have to
rely on state officials to do their constitutional duty, to uphold the federal
constitution, and to apply these constraints themselves as they are developing
the legislation. In fact, what you find is that many lower courts, although
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they feel constrained by Zschernig test, will often point first to the motive or
purpose of the state statute in their threshold effects analysis. That is some
proof that the judges themselves are most comfortable examining motive or
purpose.
Additionally, motive or purpose review poses much less risk to the
benefits, or values, of federalism. The range of state measures that
potentially could be captured by the threshold effects test far exceeds those
that might be captured by motive or purpose review
In the time remaining, let me turn to the second aspect of the irrelevance
of federalism. What limits are there on the federal government's use of its
international agreement making powers based on our federal system of
government? Let me step back up here.
The U.S. federal government enters into international agreements in two
major ways. The first is the treaty clause method in which the President
gains the approval of two thirds of the Senate for an agreement he has
negotiated. The second is the Congressional Executive Agreement in which
the President garners the approval of the simple majority of both Houses of
Congress. The textural basis for Congressional Executive agreements is the
Commerce Clause plus the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Returning to federalism limits on these two methods, one can imagine
four theoretical possibilities.
The first possibility is that there are no federalism limits on the treaty power
relying on Missouri v. Holland but that such limits are imposed on
Congressional Executive Agreements.
Remember, the textual basis for
Executive Congressional Agreements is the Commerce Clause combined
with the Necessary and Proper Clause and it is in the interpretation of those
clauses that the Supreme Court has revived federalism limits. This
possibility is the strongest of the four because it is consonant with existing
Supreme Court opinions.
The second theoretical possibility is that federalism limits apply neither to
the treaty power nor to Congressional Executive Agreements because
Missouri v. Holland is rationale relating to matters of the utmost urgency
extends to Congressional Executive Agreements. The problem with this
argument is that the Supreme Court in the cases dealing with federalism
limits, the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, has
rejected national importance- type arguments.
The third possibility, one the revisionist school might argue for,
maintains that the U.S. Supreme Court would reverse Missouri v. Holland
and find that the new federalism limits, the limits that Professor Farber spoke
7 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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about, not only place limits on Congressional Executive Agreements, but
also place limits on the treaty power.
The only theoretical possibility that is not plausible is that there are
federalism limits on the treaty power, but not Congressional Executive
Agreements. You would have to fly in the face of the U.S. Supreme Court
precedents on both fronts to be successful with this argument.
Irrespective of these possibilities, the most important point for purposes
of U.S.-Canada relations and negotiations in the WTO and in the hemisphere
is that the limits that Professor Farber spoke about in the Lopez 8 case and
other cases dealing with commandeering will not inhibit the federal
government from entering into international trade agreement obligations
binding the states in areas such as services, investment, government
procurement and subsidies. 9 Instead, it is political constraints that may
inhibit the federal government from pursuing liberalization of state measures
in trade negotiations. Accordingly, state federal cooperation measures must
be enhanced to reduce the political constraints on the federal government.' °
Thank you.
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